Theoretical foundations[ edit ] While realism predicts that conflict should be the norm in international relations, regime theorists say that there is cooperation despite anarchy. Often they cite cooperation in trade, human rights , and collective security , among other issues. These instances of cooperation are regimes. The most commonly cited definition comes from Stephen Krasner , who defines regimes as "institutions possessing norms, decision rules, and procedures which facilitate a convergence of expectations". In international political economy[ edit ] As stated above, a regime is defined by Stephen D. Krasner as a set of explicit or implicit "principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations".
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Kenneth A. Oye, ed. His answers are an early attempt to link insights from game theory and macroeconomics, security studies and international political economy. He stresses that this analysis applies only to the class of games where cooperation is necessary to realize mutual interests, and suggests that analyses of cooperation in IR should only use stag hung, chicken, and PD as games of last resort after harmony and deadlock are ruled out. Reciprocity can be encouraged through enhancement of recognition capacities: the explicit codification and clarification of norms, as well as surveillance and verification mechanisms, serve to reduce ambiguity and increase transparency.
The shadow of the future can be lengthened and single-play situations turned into iterated oes by decomposing interactions over time e. Finally, Oye discusses how cooperation becomes more difficult in N-person games, thanks to increasing complexity, rising transaction and information costs, the failure of conditional cooperation and the possibility of free-riding, etc. Some of these problems can be alleviated through conventions to diminish transaction and information costs , regime creation, collective enforcement mechanisms, and so on.
Alternatively, another way to promote cooperation is to reduce the number of actors necessary to realize common interests. Bilateral and regional decomposition through discriminatory strategies can do this, albeit at the cost of lowered gains from cooperation and the risk of causing negative externalities.
George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation. They approach this question through a formal analysis of arms races, informed by a historical analysis of nineteenth and twentieth-century arms races that ended up peacefully. DRS define arms race as continual mutual defection DD.
These condition produce nine orderings, listed on p. Of these, four are related to Deadlock i. DRS claim that these preferences and situations are not as pathological as others have assumed, and can explain the Anglo-German naval race before WW1, and the preferences of the Germans in the 30s and Soviets in the 50s. They concede is thoroughly irrelevant, but conclude negotiation might work even if both prefer defection, if issue-linking can alter the payoff structure. Strategic misrepresentation is when one side tries to extract concessions in a bargaining situation by pretending to have preferences it does not hold.
However such a bluff can be called, and in order to maintain credibility, the preference must be followed e. Imperfect intelligence e. This yields further games that could lead to arms races, including the stag hunt Problems of interpretation the result of experience or ideology can have the same effect as poor information. Control problems can cause arms races to continue if decision makers cannot cooperate or more subtly, signal their desire to cooperate but cannot actually do so or defect to punish defection, because their governments resist change.
DRS claim that the ability of bureaucracies to kill policy changes through leaks to the press explains why leaders use summits and personal envoys to move through important stages of negotiations.
Unilateral strategies are vulnerable to pressures of uncertainty, especially given the subjective variance among interpretations of what constitutes a defensive rather than offensive weapons system e. Finally, information and control problems diminish the effectiveness of Tit-for-Tat, though it remains superior to other strategies, especially when modified so as to retaliate less frequently in order to account for possible misinformation and lack of control.
Conybeare analyzes what promotes or inhibits cooperation in these three wars along the three dimensions discussed by Oye: payoff structure, iteration, and number of actors. In his study of the Franco-Italian and other late C19 trade wars, Conybeare examines how asymmetry in payoff structure can affect cooperation. Eventually the costs of DD for Italy were so high that it accepted major concessions to return to a higher level of cooperation — which was still less than the original state of CC.
GATT, which was created to arbitrate trade disputes, ends up constraining the ability to retaliate in the future. He explains that the two sides failed to sustain cooperation over several centuries of iterated conflict thanks to very high transaction costs, the influence of rent seeking interest groups on negotiations, and a sustained economic recession in England which raised the current marginal value of defection in the form of predatory income transfers, and lowered the shadow of the future.
Finally the free-rider problem enters trade wars in the form of the MFN treaty clause, which creates a public good by specifying that states cannot grant a concession to one state without granting it to all states. Conybeare takes this large-number public-good problem to be the crux of the Hawley-Smoot wars. While the public-good problem had existed earlier, after World War 1 there were many more countries involved, as well as further complications like war industries and reparations.
As a result others retaliated by attempting to remove the public good of MFN privileges via country quotas, cartel arrangements, and other preferential mechanisms. Without such exclusionary devices, or else a coercive regime such as GATT, Conybeare concludes, there is no shadow of the future. Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Their key point is that IPE and security cooperation can be analyzed with the same framework. AK conclude by arguing that a focus on the broader contexts of international interactions —namely issue linkages, multi-level games, reciprocity in complex situations, and the role of international institutions — is crucial to understand how actors can adopt strategies to alter payoff structures, lengthen the shadow of the future, and break down N-player games, all of which can promote cooperation as distinct from harmony of interests under conditions of anarchy.
James D. Fearon argues against scholars in both the neo-realist and neo-liberal camps who use various 2x2 representations to characterize the strategic setting in international relations. Such scholars distinguish various international contexts into categories such as P. Much of the debate between neo-realist and neo-liberals has occurred, for example, over issues such as whether cooperation can be sustained under a P.
Fearon proposes that it is more accurate and theoretically fruitful to see most international cooperation as occurring under a common strategic structure.
This structure has two stages: 1. This type of game cannot easily be represented in 2x2 form and is better characterized as an n-round interaction with discounting. Enforcement — A repeated P. Several interesting implications arise from this analysis: 1. This contrasts to traditional measures such as state size and capability. States will only seriously bargain over issues in which enforcement is reasonably feasible.
Therefore scholars studying cooperation will face selection bias if they only look at cases where such negotiation takes place. Contrary to common neo-liberal claims, an extended shadow of the future can be inimical for cooperation. Neo-liberals often assert that a long shadow of the future is good for cooperation since it dissuades players from pursuing single-shot defection in a repeated P.
In Stage 1, states might actually choose to hold out longer during the bargaining process if they have a long time horizon. This can lead to fewer international agreements being struck to begin with. Hence, agreements with big consequences or a long duration will tend to be struck only after protracted negotiation if at all. Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, Berkeley: University of California Press, His explanation is that the international economic system became unstable by British inability and U.
The author argues that these functions should be organized and executed by a single country that assumes responsibility for the system. The difficulty of stabilization lay in considerable latent instability in the system and the absence of a stabilizer seriousness of the economic shock to the system does not matter much. The author compares British cooperative measures with the U.
K policies. Britain maintained free trade policy by opening their market while the U. By , however, it became clear the Britain could not exercise such leadership in international economy because its capacity for leadership had gone. But the U. Kindleberger suggests three stable and three unstable scenarios on the leadership of the world economy. The stable three are: 1 continued U. The last is the most attractive but least likely.
The unstable three are: 1 contention for leadership between major economies 2 one unable to lead and the others unwilling as was in to 3 each [actors] retaining a veto over programs of stability or strengthening of the system without seeking to secure positive programs of its own. Hegemonic stability theory is the exploration of connections between hegemony and economic liberalization, and between hegemony and peace.
Hegemonic stability theory was first noted regarding the British Empire and the rise of free trade by E. Carr Gilpin revived the subject in the language of modern political science, and ensuing discussion of Kindleberger and others ended in the mids.
After a short pause in the discussion of hegemonic stability theory, Lake attempts to bring hegemonic stability theory from the "museum" of graduate student syllabi back onto the active research program of political science research, regardless of the "catcalls" of his peers that he received when proposing the revival at a conference.
Lake says that a productive direction for leadership theory is to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions of international economic infrastructure, and explicating when leadership is likely to be benevolent or coercive. Lake criticizes the field for theoretical sloppiness and divides the theory into "Leadership Theory", which "builds upon public goods models and seeks to explain the production of economic infrastructure" and "Hegemony Theory".
Leadership theory, exemplified by Kindleberger , holds that the public good of economic infrastructure requires a hegemon to be provided. Lake defines economic infrastructure as providing monetary liquidity to avert freezes and panics, managing foreign exchange rates, and coordinating domestic monetary policies because a stable international economy requires a secure medium of exchange and stable store of value. In addition to international monetary coordination, a hegemon provides protection for international property rights.
All of these functions are public goods. Critics outside the economic mainstream argue that these attributes of monetary and property stability are necessary for free trade, which is not a public good because free trade is good for hegemons but not necessarily good for smaller powers. At times the public good cannot be provided with one state because of the high costs of provision, but can be provided by more than one state what Lake defines as the "k-group" through Keohanian coordination.
A single leader is therefore not a "necessary condition" of the provision of the public good of international monetary and property infrastructure. The hegemon prefers economic openness, while other states are split between those that prefer openness and those that prefer protectionist strategies, depending on their mix of interest groups, discount rates, and the size of their economy.
Lake notes that hegemony theory goes against mainstream economics, in that it assumes that economic liberalization is not good for all states. Sandler discusses two models of alliances: the pure public good model and the joint product model. In the pure public good model, because the benefits of defense are nonrival and nonexcludable, defense is regarded a public good. It is nonrival because a unit of defense can be consumed by one ally without detracting from the consumption opportunities for other allies.
It is nonexcludable because the benefits of defense are available to all, once it is provided. In this model, states seek to maximize their utility functions subject to their own resource constraint see Equation 5.
Due to the public nature of the good, the collective action problem arises. First, as the number of allies increases, the extent of suboptimal provision of the good is expected to worsen. Secondly, the large, wealthy allies shoulder the defense burdens of the smaller allies.
And thirdly, the impact of endowment asymmetry among potential members on the collective action is important.
It can choose to shift military expenditures from offensive to defensive weapons in the hope that this will solve the "security dilemma" by increasing its security without decreasing that of its opponent. It can attempt to convince its rival of the futility of increased arms expenditures by announcing that it will henceforth spend neither more nor less on defense than the rival. Or it can propose that the two states initiate formal arms talks. Each of these actions represents a different type of strategy designed to promote cooperation. The essay contains a substantial amount of both formal and historical analysis. For example, when states employ "bargaining chip" strategies or attempt to convince a rival that they are stronger than they really are in order to gain policy leverage in other areas as the Soviet Union did in the late s , an arms race may develop or accelerate even though the structure of the payoffs suggests that cooperation should result.
Kenneth A. Oye
International relations; science and technology policy; risk governance; biotechnology; information technology. His work in technology policy has focused on adaptive management of risks associated with synthetic biology, pharmaceuticals, the internet and nuclear energy, with papers in Nature, Science, Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics, Politics and the Life Sciences and Issues in Science and Technology. Research My work divides into studies on international relations IR and technology policy. The detailed research narrative below describes how my theories on cooperation, externalities management and adaptive strategy developed in IR now provide a foundation for my current work in technology policy. International Relations As a student and young faculty member during an era of Cold War crises, military interventions, and economic distress, I turned from engineering to political science and economics. My IR work provided a theoretical basis for addressing problems of that time and continues to be used by IR scholars. Cooperation under Anarchy developed a theoretical foundation for realization of mutual interests in the absence of centralized authority, with applications to security and economic affairs.
KENNETH OYE COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY PDF
Zulkimi Fill in your details below anarchg click an icon to log in: When I was in graduate school several years ago, my friends and I would routinely share our reading notes with one another. Bargaining, Enforcement, and international cooperation. Maybe innot that many political scientists were as familiar with these concepts oue they are today. See Fearon for a formal contradiction to two points made here. This path-breaking book offers fresh insights into a perennial problem. Drawing on a diverse set of historical cases in security and economic affairs, the contributors cooperwtion this special issue of World Politics not only provide a unified explanation of the incidence of cooperation and conflict, but also suggest strategies to promote the emergence of cooperation.